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France and Germany have been the motor of European integration for half a century. 
During this process their economies have converged to a remarkable degree. Their 
present difficulties in terms of economic growth, unemployment and public debt are 
shown to depend largely on fallacies of macroeconomic management, rather than on 
the “European social model”, which they have adopted. 
 
However, European monetary union has profoundly changed the conduct of 
macroeconomic management in Euroland. Structural reforms alone cannot improve 
the economic performance in large regions of a monetary union, unless they are 
supported by fiscal policies determined at the European level. This opens important 
questions for democracy and the governance of  Europe.  S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  3
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France and Germany have been the motor of European integration for half a century. 
Together, they represent roughly a third of the EU’s population and half of Euroland’s 
GDP. The construction of modern Europe would not have been possible without the 
reconciliation of these two nations after the war and their close political cooperation. 
Although their social models used to be classified as “state interventionist” and 
“social market economy” or “state capitalism” versus “managed capitalism” 
(Schmidt, 2002), political orientations and social institutions seem to have converged 
in the direction of some common “European social model” (Martin and Ross, 2004).  
On the one side, both countries have opened up to globalisation and Europeanisation, 
deregulating financial and product markets and giving individuals and companies 
greater choice.  On the other side, labour markets and social regulation reflect the 
shared model of a “conservative” welfare regime clearly distinct from neo-liberal, 
Anglo-Saxon traditions or social democratic, Scandinavian countries (Esping-
Anderson, 1990). While both counties were highly successful and inspirational until 
the 1990s, something seems to have changed in recent years. Germany is no longer 
Bonn’s Federal Republic.  Previously an economic giant, it has become the laggard 
amongst the countries that form the Monetary Union.  France is paralysed by self 
doubt and growing political disenchantment and lack of economic dynamism has 
prevented the creation of jobs and caused a “social fracture.”
1  Moreover, both 
countries together seem to have lost their capacity to act as political initiators.  They 
are no longer the powerhouse for European integration in an enlarged Union of 25 
countries .  
 
Exploring the causes of this development would require a book in itself. It is today 
fashionable to blame France and Germany’s underperformance, relative to the USA or 
the UK, on the inflexibilities of the economic structures underlying the “European 
social model” (Amable, 2004).  But the story is more complex, as we will see.  Not 
only France and Germany; but all of Europe is challenged by the economic 
transformation resulting from globalisation and changes in demography.  They all 
share the challenge of reconstructing the social model on which Western Europe has 
been built.  In addition, the German economy is still under shock from the 
consequences of its unification and this has also affected neighbouring European 
                                                 
1 The expression was coined by J. Chirac during his presidential election campaign in 1995.   S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  5
countries.  Finally, the political dynamics of European integration, and particularly the 
creation of European monetary union, have transformed the established patterns of 
economic development and adjustment.  I will argue that re-igniting economic growth 
in Germany and France, and Euroland as a whole, requires a solution of the inefficient 
governance of the Eurozone, with the formation of a political union with full 
democratic legitimacy (see also Collignon 2003, 2004).  Unless France and Germany 
lead the way here again, there is a risk that half a century of European integration will 
be eroded by political gridlock.  However, political cooperation needs economic 
foundations.  If the two countries’ economic performances converge, common 
policies are more likely to be sustainable than if developments point in different 
directions.  While most of the “models of capitalism” literature analyses changes (or 
persistence) in institutions and behaviours, I will focus here on the economic 
infrastructure of the French and German models of society. 
 
I will first compare their economic structures and performances, and then turn to the 
question how France and Germany are adopting to Euroland. 
 
 
Features of French and German economic performance 
 
Evaluating the structural features of France and Germany’s economic performance  
requires a look at the long term.  I will therefore focus on the persistence and changes 
in economic variables dating back several decades.
2  I will first analyse the growth 
performance, then the contribution of labour and capital and finally discuss the role of 
the public sector.   
 
The problem with economic growth 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, under the Bretton Woods System, economic growth was 
generally high, on average around 4 to 5 percent.
3  During the Golden Age of Bretton 
                                                 
2 In this paper, all data are taken from the European Commission’s AMECO data bank, unless 
alternatively indicated. 
3 In France, it has become fashionable to talk of the “trentes glorieuses” (1945-75), but overshadowed 
by serious economic difficulties, the late 1940s and 1970s were hardly glorious. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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Woods, productivity grew rapidly, unemployment was practically non-existent and 
high rates of investment helped to modernise France and Germany.  Germany thrived 
on its model of “social market economy” and in France, the new Fifth Republic 
finally provided the framework for political, fiscal and economic stability that became 
the backdrop for expansion and Keynesian macroeconomic policies. 
 
The growth of GDP 
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Germany experienced its first post war recession in 1966, but this was quickly 
remedied when Social Democrats joined the government and introduced Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies into the ordo-liberal model of the social market economy.  
The Golden Age came to an end in 1971/73.  Irresponsible US policies had caused 
rising world-wide inflation, leading to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System. 
In the context of the subsequent flexible exchange rate regime, the severe oil shocks 
of the 1970s transformed the framework for economic policy and development.  The 
Age of Great Inflation and major recessions followed the tripling of the oil price in S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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1973.  Figures 2 show that France first accommodated inflation, but changed policy 
after 1983, when converging to the German model of price stability through 
competitive disinflation became the priority.  After German unification in 1991, 
French inflation remained significantly below German inflation. 
 
The second oil shock in 1979 was followed by harsh disinflation policies worldwide.  
Starting in the USA, interest rates rose worldwide to very high levels.  As a 
consequence, economic growth fell in all industrialised countries, but in France and 
Germany it never came back to the previous levels. Resisting inflation more radically 
(accepting even a fall in the consumer price level in 1986) and embarking on drastic 
fiscal consolidation after Kohl took power in 1982, German economic growth 
suffered more than French.  It is useful to compare this performance with the UK as 
an alternative to the French and German model.  Britain’s economic growth remained 
systematically behind France and Germany in those years, while inflation was higher. 
Growth only started to pick up after inflation was brought down in the mid-1980s but 
it fell behind when the Thatcher government first started to shadow the Deutschmark 
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After the second oil shock and the subsequent long period of disinflation, economic 
crisis became an endemic phenomenon, at least within the European Monetary 
System. Unemployment and public debt shot up, largely driven by shocks, and the 
subsequent resumption of growth was never sufficient to reduce these variables to 
their previous levels (Figures 3 and 4).  In the UK, however, results were different.  
Although unemployment increased more rapidly after shocks, it has continuously 
declined since 1993.  The contrast is even more dramatic with respect to fiscal policy.  
After World War II, Britain was left with a huge public debt, which was gradually 
brought down by conservative budget policies and higher rates of inflation. The 
Thatcher government particularly focused on budget consolidation from 1984 to 1989.  
But during the subsequent ERM-period, deficits rose again, peaking at 8 percent of 
GDP in 1993. Only in 1998 did the budget move into surplus again, lowering the 
debt- GDP ratio.  
 S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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Many economists have explained the persistence of the dissatisfying experience in 
France and Germany during the 1980s and 1990s by the role of institutions. Labour 
market institutions are most prominent. It is argued that social protection was high, 
making labour markets inflexible and pushing the public sector beyond sustainable 
levels. By contrast in Britain, the Thatcher reforms created flexibility and dismantled 
the state. A recent study by Bertelsmann Foundation (2004) reiterates the argument: 
France and Germany are classified as “red lanterns” with rank 20 and 21 respectively 
on an index of 21 industrialised countries that measures economic activity and labour S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  10
market performance.  The authors see the inflexibilities of German wage bargaining 
systems, employment protection and the crowding out of private investment by 
excessive public expenditure as the main culprits for this negative development.   Sinn 
(2003) has made similar charges, claiming Germany needed a “radical cultural 
revolution” like Britain, before Thatcher.  It is, however, remarkable that in the 
Bertelsmann Study, Germany’s performance index improved from 80 to 110 between 
1987 and 1991 and then, after unification, it fell continuously to below 70.  This puts 
some question marks behind the proposed explanations.  As Blanchard (2004) has 
pointed out, labour market institutions had already come into being before 1970s and 
were not incompatible with low unemployment and high growth in those years.  Since 
the mid-1980s, reforms actually improved labour and product market flexibility, but 
unemployment has not fallen significantly. Labour market institutions are therefore a 
doubtful variable for the explanation of low economic growth in France and 
Germany.
4   
 
If there is a set of institutions that clearly has changed in a profound way since the 
early 1970s, it is monetary institutions - the change in international and national 
monetary systems has transformed the nature of economic policy making.  Under the 
fixed exchange rate system, monetary policy was endogenous and internationalist, 
while fiscal policy was exogenous and could be used for macroeconomic demand 
management.  With flexible exchange rates, monetary policy became exogenous, 
focusing on national objectives, like price stability, and fiscal policy became 
endogenous.
5  With the growing dominance of private capital flows, monetary policy 
became subject to the “quality control” of private investors.  The international 
monetary system changed from a government-led to a market-led system as the large 
volumes of petro-dollars needed to be recycled and financial controls were abolished 
(Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni, 1994).  Private financial markets have also become 
more dominant in both countries.  Equity financing has increased and firms’ market 
capitalisation has been rising rapidly.  Large companies increasingly make use or 
securitization and less of their “Hausbank.”  This transformation has gone further in 
France than in Germany, partly because French industry is more strongly dominated 
                                                 
4 This does not exclude that labour market reforms may have merit in themselves, especially in order to 
ensure the sustainability of the welfare state, as Scandinavians countries have demonstrated. 
5 By endogenous fiscal policies, I mean that the debt dynamics depend more on interest rates and 
growth than on the discretionary variations of public spending. (See Collignon and Mundschenk, 
(1999) S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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by large companies and Germany by smaller Mittelststand.  In the context of general 
financial market liberalisation, maintaining price stability was a necessary condition 
for financial assets to be an attractive store of wealth.  Combating inflation required 
high interest rates, and as a consequence, economic growth faltered and public debt 
exploded.  As a consequence, fiscal policy could no longer be used for discretionary 
action and the focus moved to debt consolidation. The high levels of interest rates 
reduced the scope for profitable investment opportunities, while the volatility of 
exchange rates and other financial variables created uncertainty for long term 
investors and the investment ratio fell (Figure 5). This reinforced economic stagnation 
and a general sense of “crisis”: labour productivity and technological progress slowed 
down as the capital stock became older and real wage increases reflected this 
development. Interestingly, in the UK, the investment ratio has remained well below 
France and Germany, despite the supposedly business-friendly reforms of the 
Thatcher government.   
 
The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) by Helmut Schmidt and 
Valery Giscard D’Estaing was the first institutional response to these shocks, aiming 
to create “a zone of monetary stability” (Collignon and Schwarzer, 2003). 
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The German Deutschmark soon became the anchor for countries who sought to 
stabilize their economic environment.  But at the same time, this peg made them 
vulnerable to the spill-over effects from domestic policies in Germany. France 
probably suffered more than any other country from the Bundesbank policies, because S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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of the unintended deflationary consequences of bloc floating. In fact, it can be shown 
that in a world, where many countries peg to a few anchor currencies and where these 
key currencies float freely against each other, the peripheral countries suffer 
deflationary pressures and these pressures are the larger, the larger a pegged country’s 
size is relative to the anchor (Collignon, 2002). This was clearly the case for France in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but also for Italy or the UK, until it left in ERM. 
 
The second institutional response, which aimed at overcoming these deficiencies, was 
the creation of a unified monetary policy that began in the mid-1980s after the Single 
European Act had opened the way for a truly integrated European market.  The path 
to completion of the project was arduous.  In the early 1990s, after the Berlin Wall 
had come down, Germany experienced a temporary boost in demand. But when the 
Bundesbank reacted by tight monetary policies, the boom was quickly followed by a 
recession, which hit Germany’s neighbours first, because the interest shock was 
amplified by the exchange rate mechanism. However, when growth resumed in the 
mid 1990s, the German economy suffered from the indigestion of the East. GDP-
growth has remained persistently low. By contrast, France benefited from the advent 
of European Monetary Union, which dissolved the deflationary bias of block floating. 
Its growth performance was again significantly higher than Germany’s (Figure 1). 
 
Thus, for over half a century, France has grown on average faster than Germany with 
the exception of the late 1970s and the “hard EMS-years” in the early 1990s. 
However, the range of growth differentials between the two countries is only 
plus/minus 1 percent, indicating significant convergence and similarities between the 
two economies. Furthermore, the movement of GDP growth rates is usually well 
correlated between France and Germany. Since the 1970s the coefficient of 
correlation over a 5-year period has always been above 60 percent; in the 1990s it was 
even above 90 percent. The only significant exceptions were caused by major 
“national shocks”: first, in 1982, the left-Keynesian experiment after Mitterrand came 
to power, then in the early 1990s when German unification also created a major 
asymmetric demand shock in the European Union. Thus, France’s and Germany’s 
economies seem to be well tuned to each other and respond in similar, symmetric 
fashion to exogenous shocks;  only politics seems to be able to divide the two 
economies.  S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  13
 
For both countries, the turning points in their development have been the two oil 
shocks, German unification and more recently, the regime change of EMU. But one 
has to keep in mind that one shock rarely comes alone: the first oil shock came soon 
after the demise of Bretton Woods, the second oil shock was followed by the so-called 
Volker-shock, a highly restrictive monetarist anti-inflation policy worldwide. German 
unification also caused tight money and high interest rates. European Monetary Union 
may have been accelerated after the German unification shock
6, but it reflected 
institutional regime change.  At first, it gave rise to the “magic of all beginnings” 
(Herman Hesse), with a boom in 2000. But American economic policies, coupled with 
9/11, caused a recession that spelt over into Europe. France and Germany seem to 
have been slow to move out from it. We will need to clarify why. Can the social 
model be blamed? 
 
Per capita income 
For an evaluation of the relative performance of the social-economic model of society, 
it is more appropriate to concentrate on the average income per person i.e GDP per 
capita.  Figure 6 shows per capita income in current euro prices for France and 
Germany as well as for the UK and the USA.  The growth of capita income has 




                                                 
6 The myth that EMU was “the  price” Germany had to pay for its unification is false. The EMU-
project had a long history and was prepared by Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d’Estaing long 
before Kohl and Mitterrand took it on as their own.  It was a systemic necessity after the creation of the 
single market.  See Collignon and Schwarzer, 2002. 
7 The growth rate is reflected in the slope of the logarithmic chart in Figure 6.  I have used nominal per 
capita income in euro, as it seems the more reliable indicator for relative income levels between 
countries. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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Germany’s image as a rich and powerful country dates back to the 1970s and 1980s 
when per capita income grew faster than in France.  In 1960, the two countries were at 
similar levels around 1,260 euros per head.  Eight years later, German nominal per 
capita income had fallen 10 percent below French levels. However, comparing these 
nominal data with real per capital income reveals that this improvement in French 
relative wealth was largely due to higher inflation under the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Several subsequent revaluations of the Deutschmark contributed to the 
rebalancing of German relative income. In 1987, with nominal per capita income of 
16,128 euros, the average German citizen was about 18 percent more prosperous than 
his French counterpart. These trends may explain why it took so long to appreciate the 
value of price stability in France: with fixed exchange rates, inflation seems to 
increase relative income, even if competitiveness suffers. In Germany, a strong 
Deutschmark and nominal revaluations were tools that apparently made the country 
more prosperous, while low inflation relative to other European partners in the EMS 
ensured high competitiveness. This logic came to an end in the early 1990s, when 
France and most other EU-members states converged to price stability, but the myth 
of the beneficial strength of the DM continued to haunt the German public debate 
until 1997.  Germans also took time to realize that unification had caused a 
fundamental regime change.  The country’s long-term trend had been broken and the 
pattern of economic development transformed.  By merging with the unproductive S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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assets of the former German Democratic Republic, per capita income of the united 
Germany fell from 20,646 euros in the former West Germany to 17,912 euros of the 
united Germany in 1991, a reduction of 13 percent.  Since then the prosperity of 
Germans relative to French citizens has been falling continuously and has achieved 
equality by now.   
 
The performances of the US and the UK, relative to France and Germany, are also 
interesting. Converting their per capita income into euros is obviously affected by 
fluctuations in the exchange rate.  This is most evident for the US in the mid 1980s 
and in the early 21
st century when the dollar was overvalued.  However, the 
apparently spectacular performance of the UK is largely due to the strengthening of 
pound sterling relative to the euro in the late 1990s until 2002, while the Thatcher 
years do not stick out as a remarkable performance. In purchasing power terms, the 
three major European countries (or four if Italy is added), have essentially the same 




Which factors determine per capita income?  In line with orthodox economic thinking, 
we will first look at the supply side of the economy.  We can approach this question 
from two angles by focusing solely on the role of labour and its apparent productivity 
or considering the shared contribution of labour and capital to output.  Let us start 
with the role of labour alone. Per capita income then depends on the rate of labour 
productivity and the rate of employment in the total population.  Figure 7 shows the 
medium term evolution of labour productivity. In order to catch the structural 
features, I took the moving average over a five-year period, thereby smoothing out 
some of the short-term business cycle distortions. The most striking features are the 
high growth rates in the Golden Age of the 1960s, their dramatic collapse in the 
1970s, a short-lived pick-up in the late 1980s and further slowdown since the 1990s.  
Despite smoothing out business cycle effects, labour productivity seems strongly 
affected by oil shocks and economic recessions.    S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  16
Figure 7. Average labour productivity growth 
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Since the early 1990s, labour productivity growth has fallen again in both France and 
Germany, but for different reasons. The reduction in France by more than 50 percent 
is partly due to the productivity measure of output per employee, which was 
negatively affected by the reduction of working hours, especially the loi Robien (June 
1996) and the lois Aubry I (June 1998) and II (January 2000).  As a consequence, 
measured labour productivity, i.e. the ratio of output per person employed has slowed 
down, although labour productivity per hour worked does not seem to have suffered 
(INSEE, 2003) or even increased (Fiole et Roger, 2002). The deceleration of German 
labour productivity since unification, has been more rapid than in France, with the 
exception of the last few years.  Germany improved productivity growth immediately 
after the Berlin Wall came down, partly because of the resulting demand boom, partly 
because of the liquidation of unproductive assets in the East after unification. But 
Germany now seems to have returned to its steady state of productivity growth that 
has prevailed since the 1980s, although it is possible that the Schröder reforms are 
changing the trend.   This negative performance contrasts with the steady increases of 
labour productivity in the US economy since the early 1990s.  In the UK, labour 
productivity has been more volatile – although, it has taken a more stable path in 
recent years.  The lesson from figure 7 is that labour productivity developments 
cannot be attributed simply to specific forms of social models.  At certain times, 
Germany and France have been leaders, while the Anglo-Saxon model was clearly S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  17
inferior.  In recent years, this seems to have changed but one has to be careful in 




Why did labour productivity increase? Most growth theories model labour 
productivity as a function of capital intensity, i.e. the capital-labour ratio. By using 
more capital, workers are becoming more productive, ceteris paribus.  A look at this 
ratio shows that during the 1960s, German capital intensity grew faster than in France, 
advanced at the same speed in the 1970s, but stagnated in the 1980s.  In fact, a first 
break comes in 1983 with the change to the Kohl government, which pursued 
aggressive budget consolidation and a limited roll-back of the welfare state (Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2004).  Unification has caused a second major shock in the data for Germany. 
The under-capitalisation of East Germany necessitated a rapid capacity building, but 
capital accumulation per worker has now returned to previous levels. The amount of 
capital per worker used in 1991 in the old West German Federal Republic was 162.6 
thousand euros; in the new unified Germany, this value was reduced to 144.7 
thousand euros.  Significant private and public investment efforts followed to build up 
the East and in 1996, the united Germany reached the same capital stock per worker 
that West Germany had attained in 1990.  At this point, labour productivity has also 
returned to the level, which had prevailed in the West in 1990. However, capital 
accumulation per worker has continued to decelerate until 2002 and so did labour 
productivity. By contrast in France, the accumulation of capital per worker follows a 
smoother path, decelerating at a slow rate from mid-1970 until the beginning of 
EMU.
8 In the two Anglo-Saxon countries, the growth of capital intensity is more 
volatile, but it is clear that their improvements in labour productivity since the mid-
1990s are correlated with increases in the capital intensity.  In the late 1990s, several 
reforms reduced average working time per worker and, as a consequence, the slow 
down in capital intensity growth accelerated (INSEE, 2003).  It only returned to 
previous levels after these effects were incorporated in economic behaviour. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the null-hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% confidence interval, 
so that we can assume that the growth of capital intensity decelerates at the rate of –0.07 percent.  
Partly, this deceleration trend may reflect the technological catch up of the French economy to US-
levels.   S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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If labour productivity has grown less rapidly than previously, per capita income may 
still have improved by bringing more people into work.  Figure 9 shows that a good 
part of the improved prosperity in France can be related to the increasing rates of 
employment in the 1960s and 1970s and again in the run up to, and early years of, the 
euro.  The oil shocks caused temporary stagnation in the employment rates, both in 
France and Germany. The main improvement in average German income during the 
1980s was therefore due to the higher rate of employment, just as the reduction in 
wealth after German unification is due to the loss of employment in the eastern part of 
Germany.  In France, the number of people in employment used to be stagnant, but 
increased after the labour market reforms aiming to reduce working time in the late 
1990s.  But, because apparent productivity growth per employee decreased, the rise in 
the employment rate in France has not significantly contributed to higher income for 
the average French person in this decade.  On the other side, the British improvement 
in per capita income is mainly due to higher employment rates since New Labour 
came into power.  Only in recent years has it been complemented by higher 
productivity.  In America, per capita income improved due to high employment 
during the Clinton years, but deteriorated after George W Bush came into power.   S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  19
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The aggregate employment figures hide some important transformation of the 
economic structures in France and Germany. In both countries, the share of 
employment in manufacturing has fallen, and the share in services has increased. 
While Germany has always had a larger manufacturing industry than France (42 
percent against 31 percent in the early 1960s, 22 percent versus 15 percent today), the 
relative weight has continuously declined. Clearly, Germany’s larger industrial sector 
is a sign of its comparative advantage, which also shows up in export figures. But the 
reduction of the manufacturing sector in both countries to nearly half its previous 
importance reflects the profound change in the world economy, where an increasing 
amount of manufacturing is produced in formerly less developed countries. For 
example, the share of world exports in textiles from developing countries has 
increased between 1980 and 1995 from 34 to 54 percent, in chemicals from 7.8 to 
16.4 percent in machinery from 5.8 to 22 percent. (Baker, Epstein and Pollin, 1998: 
16). These are the consequences of globalisation.  In France, they have contributed to 
job losses in manufacturing of roughly one million, between 1973 and 1991 and a 
further 570 thousand between 1992 and 2005. In West Germany, the loss was 510 
thousand between 1973 and 1991, but 2.6 million since unification. As Figure 9b 
shows, this dramatic change has largely been to the detriment of East Germany today: 
Unified Germany employs the same amount of workers in manufacturing that West 
Germany would have employed without the East.  However, this dramatic social S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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transformation is not the fault of Germany’s social model.  Despite all liberal market 
flexibility, the UK lost 3 million jobs in manufacturing between 1973 and 1991 and 
855 thousand between 1992 and 2004. 
 
 
Job losses in manufacturing have been more than compensated by job gains in 
services. France created 4.2 million between 1973 and 1991 and 2.7 million between 
1992 and 2001. The equivalent amounts in Germany were 5.5 and 3.4 millions. In the 
UK they amount to 3.7 and 2.9 millions. Thus, contrary to a wide-spread perception, 
France and Germany are not lagging behind the UK in creating jobs in services. 
 
 
Total factor productivity 
The second approach to explaining per capita income looks at the improvement of the 
economy with respect to the contribution that the two factors of production, labour 
and capital, make jointly to the creation of aggregate output.  Figure 9a indicated the 
additional input of labour into the production process. We will now focus on the role 
of capital. Figure 5 showed the evolution of the investment ratio, i.e. the increase of 
the capital stock over GDP. In this section, I will refer to the rate of capital 
accumulation, i.e. the growth rate of the capital stock, but to keep the paper short, I 
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will not show the chart separately. Its general pattern is similar to Figure 5, also the 
variations are more volatile. 
 
First, we notice that during the years of high economic growth in France and 
Germany, capital accumulation was high – but low in the Anglo-Saxon economies.  
The growth rate of the capital stock fell after the first oil shock continuously until the 
mid 1980s from over 5 percent to below 2 percent.  In the second half of the 1980s, 
when economic growth resumed, capital accumulation also accelerated, although in 
the 1990s, after the German unification shock and the high interest rate policy in the 
European Monetary system, growth of the capital stock fell back in both France and 
Germany – attaining its lowest historical level in France.  In the run up to European 
monetary union, when interest rates started to come down in the late 1990s, French 
capital accumulation resumed, although it collad again during the world slump 
following 9/11: the capital stock grew only at a historically low level of 1.7 percent.  
In Germany capital accumulation is today also at its lowest historical point since 
World War II - at less than 1 percent growth of the capital stock and an investment 
share of 18 percent.  This slowdown in capital accumulation contrasts significantly 
with the performance of the US and the UK since the early 1990s where the capital 
stock has grown at rates in excess of 2.5 or even 3 percent.  The different 
Figure 10. Total factor productivity growth
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performances between continental Europe and the Atlantic countries may explain the 
attractiveness of the Anglo-Saxon model over the last decade.  
 
The efficiency of the combined use of labour and capital is measured by total factor 
productivity (TFP). A huge literature has tried to explain, which factors affect this 
efficiency residual. The accumulation of human capital, education, training, research 
and development are the most prominent research variables, while newer theories also 
look at the role of institutions.  Policy makers have drawn their conclusions, too.  The 
Lisbon Strategy, decided by the European Council meeting in 2000, focuses on 
improving total factor productivity by emphasising education, the knowledge 
economy, research and development and education. So far the success has remained 
questionable to say the least (Kok, 2004).  Neo-liberal economists claim that greater 
flexibility in markets and social arrangements would improve TFP. But this is not 
obvious from the facts.  While it is true that in recent years the Anglo-Saxon model 
seems to have fared better, it is also interesting that TFP is correlated with oil shocks 
and macro economic performance.  In particular in the UK, total factor productivity 
has improved during the Thatcher reform years in the mid-1980s, but collapsed during 
the DM-pegging period. After the exit from the ERM, TFP caught up with previous 
growth rates. But only under New Labour has TFP finally settled at, what appears for 
the moment, a steady state above 1 percent growth per annum. This is more than twice 
the German rate, but France seems to oscillate between the two. It therefore does not 
seem justified to blame the difference in economic performance on social models 
alone.  
 
The fundamental question is why economic growth in France and Germany has been 
so low and unemployment levels and public debt so high over the last few decades. 
The explanation of the inflexible social model remains inconsistent with a number of 
facts. First of all, if there was underperformance, it only occurred in the recent decade, 
while the institutions of the social system are much older (Blanchard, 2004).  In fact, 
they seemed to have contributed to better performances in earlier years.  Second, 
rigidity and flexibility in social structures are related to institutional 
complementarities and types of strategic coordination.  They fulfil functions with 
respect to the externalities of micro-economic behaviour that cannot be changed easily 
and without unintended consequences (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  On the other hand, a S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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number of exogenous shocks and changes have already led to major adjustments in 
the economic system – from market deregulation to employment rules (Schmidt, 
2002; Martin and Ross, 2004: 14).  Many of these changes are – rightly – articulated 
in the context of European policy making.  The most profound regime change has 
been the creation of European monetary union but, as I will show below, the 
necessary consequences for Euroland’s economic governance have not been drawn.  
Hence, neither France nor Germany are reaping the full benefits from the creation of 
the euro, and these deficiencies cannot be remedied by “economic supply-side 
reforms” alone.  Rather than imposing a neo-liberal system of “flexible markets” on 
all countries, it is necessary to deal with structural reforms, such as adapting health 
insurance and pension systems to demographic change or improving the quality of the 
labour force, in their systemic context.  Micro-reforms need to be complemented by a 
supportive, macroeconomic environment where resistance to change is minimised 
(Arthus and Cette, 2004).  We therefore now need to look at the demand side. 
 
 
Growth and effective demand 
An alternative explanation for lacklustre growth in Europe is insufficient effective 
demand. This can be measured by the output gap, i.e. by the difference between actual 
and trend GDP.  Figure 11 shows the evolution of output gaps since the 1960s. The 
exactness of their measurement is, of course, subject to endless debate
9.  Nevertheless, 
the gaps indicate roughly whether, in the short term, demand was higher than the 
potential supply of output, or if it was lagging behind.  Yet, the two variables are not 
independent.  If demand remains behind supply for a considerable period of time, 
prices are depressed and investment into new productive capacities is likely to be 
reduced; inversely, if demand frequently exceeds supply, investment would be 
stimulated by profitable market opportunities.  Hence, it is difficult to disentangle 
demand and supply effects from estimated output gaps.  Rather than using the 
disputed values for output gaps, it may be more instructive to look simply at the 
distribution of number of years with positive and negative gaps.  In a world of rational 
expectations, this should give an idea of the probability that firms will encounter 
favourable or unfavourable conditions in their markets.  Over the long run, we should 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of German output gaps and different methods of calculation, see 
Sacheverständigenrat, 2003, para..734 ff. For a French discussion: Economie interationale. La Revue 
du CEPII, No 60, 1997. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  24
expect that good and bad years are equally distributed – an idea already mentioned in 
the Bible’s seven fat and meagre cows. 
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In reality, however, output gaps are not always equally distributed.  This was still the 
case in France during the 1960s and 70s, when growth was high. But in those years, 
Germany benefited of 13 years of demand stimulus against 7 years with negative 
gaps, a ratio of nearly 2:1. After 1980, the situation deteriorated in both countries. 
Germany now had only 11 out of 26 years with positive output gaps and France only 
10:26.  The likelihood of a bad year was therefore sixty percent.  Thus, for a quarter 
of a century France and Germany have suffered from insufficient demand.  Since the 
beginning of European monetary union, the situation has improved for France and for 
Euroland as a whole, but not for Germany. The probability of better demand prospects 
has increased in France (and Euroland) to 57 percent, but in Germany it is still only 43 
percent. 
 
In figures 12a and b, I have constructed a very simple index of demand, assuming that 
expectations are formed with respect to whether output gaps were positive in the 
previous, in this, and in the next period.  The index is the weighted moving average 
over these three years.
10 We find a positive correlation between high/low demand 
periods and high/low investment ratios in France and Germany.
11 We may therefore 
                                                 
10 A value of 0 implies three consecutive years of negative output gaps, a value of 0.33 or 0.66 reflects 
two negative and one positive year or respectively one negative and two positive years. The value 1 
indicates 3 consecutive years of demand exceeding supply. 
11 The coefficient of correlation is 0.526 for Germany and 0.303 for France. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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conclude that there is at least some evidence, whereby investment in these economies 
does in fact respond to the prospects of economic demand, as one would expect from 
economic theory.  If France and Germany are not doing well in terms of economic 
growth and job creation, then this cannot be blamed on their rigid social model and 
supply side effects alone.  Macroeconomic policy must play an important part in it. 
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Wages, profits, investments and jobs 
 
It should not be surprising that private investment and therefore economic growth 
respond to expectations about demand in the market. When demand prospects are 
weak, prices are depressed and firms will seek to reduce costs by improving 
productivity and increasing capital intensity, but they will not expand capacity.   
Hence, the investment ratio will fall, while the capital-labour ratio and unemployment 
will increase.  Insufficient demand can therefore cause capital-labour substitution and 
high capital intensity, even if wage moderation prevails.  In this case, it is not the 
rigidity in the labour market, but rather suboptimal macroeconomic policies, which 
would be the cause of persistent unemployment. 
 
This is what we observe in the years of lagging economic performance in France and 
Germany.  During the slump of the early 1990s, the capital-labour ratio has risen, 
while real wages (i.e. the ratio of nominal wages to the price level) also rose.  One 
may think that the capital-labour ratio has increased, because real wages have been 
pushed up by powerful trade unions and this is the cause for high unemployment. But 
wage bargaining is about nominal wages, while real wages depend also on prices and 
inflation.  If restrictive monetary policies depress prices, real wages will also rise. In 
reality we observe (see below, Figure 14b) that nominal wages have increased at the 
end of the 1980s, pushing real wages up, but as soon as the Bundesbank reacted by 
raising interest rates, a policy that spilled over into France, nominal wages have 
remained stable.  Now, it was the falling price level that pushed real wages up and this 
has maintained the pressure for higher productivity and capital-labour substitution.  
As this development, exacerbated unemployment, labour market reforms in France, 
starting in the mid-1990s, aimed to reduce working time through promoting part-time 
and less working hours per week.  In Germany, similar reforms were only becoming 
prominent under the Schröder government (see below).   
 
The dependence of job creation on aggregate demand can also be approached from a 
different angle.  It is well known that the United States and in recent years also the 
UK have had higher rates of job creation than France and Germany. The creation of 
new jobs necessarily implies that GDP grows at a faster rate than labour productivity, S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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for otherwise all additional output would simply be produced by the same labour 
force.  Comparing France, Germany and the United States, a striking feature emerges: 
the consistently high rate of GDP-growth relative to labour productivity in the US, 
and the failing demand in Europe.  In France, jobs were destroyed in the two major 
recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s. In Germany the same happened after 
unification with the East, and again in recent years. By contrast in the USA, GDP-
growth has always been higher than productivity growth and job creation is generally 
high.  In order to bring unemployment down and the employment rate up, as agreed 
between governments at the European Council in Lisbon in 2000, the rate of GDP 
growth must be in excess of productivity growth for a significant period of years.  
Lowering unemployment to 4 percent from the 9 percent where it is today, and with 
the labour force growing at a rate of 1 percent, an average job creation rate of 1.5 
percent is needed over one decade. Given recent increases in labour productivity, this 
implies GDP in Germany and France should grow between 3-3.5 percent. This is 
comparable to the growth of the US economy during the Clinton years. But how can 
this be achieved in “old Europe”? 
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The labour market 
One may argue that this job creation objective is more easily achieved if labour 
productivity is growing less strongly, a strategy sometimes called “lowering the 
employment threshold” of economic growth.
12 It is obvious that this threshold is 
determined by the growth of labour productivity and nothing else.  However, 
productivity can be measured in different ways, such as output per worker, output per 
hour worked, output per hour paid and this yields different thresholds.  Logeay (2001) 
has calculated a range between 1.1 and 2 percent for Germany in 1994-2001.  Policies 
to lower the threshold have aimed at shifting output growth towards sectors with low 
                                                 
12 In french: enrichissement de la croissance en emploi. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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productivity, frequently by developing the service sector.  They have also focused on 
the incentive structures for firms to employ low skilled labour. In France, this was 
achieved by changes in social security laws favouring part-time employment 
introduced in 1992, the reduction of social security charges on non-skilled labour in 
1995, and the reduction of working time by the lois Robien (1996), Aubry I (1998) 
and Aubry II (2000). Reforms introduced by the Schröder government have also 
focused on facilitating part-time employment with reforms in 1999 and 2003 (BMGS, 
2003) and the reduction of the relative cost of unskilled labour.  For example, the eco-
tax introduced in 1999 with estimated revenues of 57 billion euro was used to reduce 
employers’ social contribution.  In addition, measures to subsidise self-employment 
(Ich-AG) have reduced the employment threshold, too: in the first 12 months after its 
creation, 90,000 persons applied for Ich-AG status.  Although many of these measures 
are a success in themselves, the general deterioration in the economic climate has 
reduced their effectiveness.   
 
Today, the debate among economists goes even further, seeking to reduce not only 
unskilled wage costs, but even average wages. For example, Hans-Werner Sinn, 
president of the Ifo-Institute claims (2003:95): “Whoever is looking for work will find 
work, provided one allows the wage to fall far enough - for the more it falls, the more 
it will be attractive for employers to create jobs in order to exploit profitable 
opportunities.”  But this statement is misleading. First of all, whether there are 
profitable opportunities or not does not depend on nominal wage levels, but on the 
relation between nominal wages, productivity and prices. This relation is described by 
the simple identity : 
 
(1) ∆ wage share = ∆ nominal wages - ∆ prices - ∆ productivity. 
 
The inverse of the wage share is the share of capital income and presumably this is 
what investors seek to maximise
13.  But clearly, only if productivity and prices are 
assumed constant, will lower nominal wages translate into profitable opportunities.  In 
this case, profit margins will increase and this may attract investment, thereby raising 
productivity, output and creating jobs. However, assuming prices stay constant (for 
which there is no guarantee), lowering nominal wages may lead to lower productivity, 
                                                 
13 I will question this below. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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as is well known form the theory of adverse selection.  This has been confirmed with 
respect to East German wages (Görzig et al, 2004).  An INSEE study (2003) estimates 
that the slowdown in the growth of French labour productivity over the last decade 
can be attributed by a quarter to the reduction of working time, a quarter to lower 
social charges on low skilled labour and the rest is mainly due to structural changes in 
the production function. Under these circumstances unit labour costs do not 
necessarily fall with lower nominal wages. Therefore cutting wages by an average 10-
15 percent, as Sinn (2003:95) proposes,
14 could decrease the employment threshold by 
lowering productivity, but it does not assure higher employment, if there is no 
additional demand.  Furthermore, lowering productivity implies lowering standards of 
living.  This is hardly a strategy to improve the competitiveness of any country.  A 
persistent slowdown in productivity would lead to a downgrade in the position of 
wealth, influence and the power of individuals and nations.  It would make the 
consolidation of public deficits more difficult and prevent the financing of new 
collective goods and social challenges resulting from changing demography. 
 
Sinn (2003:98) argues that Germany’s problems are due to firms rationalizing 
production to compensate for excessive wage increases caused by Trade Union 
pressure.  The validity of this argument hinges on the idea that nominal wage 
increases reduce profit margins and therefore push marginal firms into liquidation.  
“Insiders” benefit from higher wages, while “outsiders” remain unemployed. Here, 
the hidden assumption is that prices and aggregate demand is constant.  Less workers 
produce the same output, but there is no additional demand to bring the unemployed 
back into employment. This assumption is also used by the political left, with trade 
unions seeking to re-distribute the fruits of technological progress by reduced working 
time.   
 
However, these measures do not really bring down unemployment, although they may 
help to make it more acceptable.  The only strategy to reduce unemployment is the 
creation of new jobs and this requires higher profits as an incentive for firms to invest. 
What matters for profit margins is the relation between prices (average income per 
unit of output) and costs per unit of output. If unit labour costs increase less than 
prices, the share of capital income will increase.  A common approach, which I will 
                                                 
14 For unskilled labour, he even recommends a reduction by 30 percent. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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question below, is to interpret the aggregate profit margin as the inverse of the wage 
share. Thus, by demanding that wage increases should remain 1 percentage point 
behind productivity, Sinn (2003:118) recommends de facto a deflation of unit labour 
costs by 1 percent. When at the same time inflation increases by 2 percent, profit 
margin would grow and the wage share would fall by 3 percent. Whether this happens 
or not is, however, a question of monetary policy and not of excessive trade union 
power. For it is generally accepted amongst economists, that it is the central bank’s 
task to look after inflation and maintain price stability.  In fact, we observe that 
despite the alleged Trade Union stranglehold, the wage share in Germany and France 
has fallen for nearly two decades (Figure 14a).  In France, it fell consistently from the 
Mitterrand policy turnaround in 1983 until the advent of the EMU. Germany’s 
development was less uniform, the most dramatic change being caused by the shock 
of unification, when acquiring non-performing assets in East Germany pushed labour 
productivity down and unit labour cost up. One may argue that this was due to rigid 
Trade Union power, but the same phenomenon would have occurred with a perfectly 
flexible labour market where labour mobility ensures a uniform market wage in 
nominal terms, while productivity levels vary between East and West.  To be fair, we 
do observe a small increase in the wage share after unification and in the boom of 
2000.  But if Sinn were right, we would expect a lasting increase in the wage share 
due to nominal wage increases in excess of productivity plus inflation.  But this is not 
what happened.  Sinn’s policy recommendation neglects price and productivity 
developments. 
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In fact wage moderation has been an essential factor in first bringing down inflation in 
France and Germany and in keeping price stability now in Euroland.  Figure 14a 
reveals, that nominal wages responded in all major economies to monetarist anti-
inflation policies and record high interest rates in the early 1980s. Only in France was 
this development delayed by Mitterrand’s initial left wing Keynesianism. But after the 
1983 decision to stay in the European Monetary System, and the new income policies 
put together by finance minister Jaques Delors, wage moderation has become an 
enduring feature in France; for nearly two decades, nominal wage increases have now 
remained behind Germany. Interestingly, the Anglo-Saxon model, characterised by 
greater flexibility in the labour market, has consistently produced higher wage 
increases. Thus the charge, so forcefully raised by Sinn, that Germany’s economy is 
“in the stranglehold of monopolistic Trade Unions” seems somewhat excessive.  
 
More important might be the development of real wages. Here we find indeed a more 
volatile performance in the Anglo-Saxon economy and more stability in France and 
Germany. While real wages increased faster in France than in Germany during the 
1970s and 80s, when labour productivity also grew at a faster rate, the two countries 
have converged in the 1990s. Since the start of EMU German real wages have 
stagnated or fallen, with the exception of the boom in 2000, while they slowed down 
markedly in France. The main reason for this significant wage moderation is 
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mounting unemployment, particularly in France (Desplatz et alt., 2003). But wage-
disindexation and active labour market policies like the reduction of working time 
have also played an important role. 
 
Neoliberal economists, like Sinn, claim that unemployment is high because wage 
rigidity, caused by excessive social protection, prevents the labour market to adjust to 
equilibrium and they propagate economic reforms that put into question the 
historically grown institutions of the welfare state and social market economy. There 
are many ways to measure labour market rigidity. As a simple indicator, Table 1 gives 
the standard deviation of nominal and real wage growth.  The difference between the 
Rhenish and the Anglo-Saxon model is less the rigidity in nominal wages, which are 
subject to wage bargaining and related institutions, but the real wage. Here, flexibility 
is generally higher in the US and the UK, although this was not the case in the 1960s. 
Thus, the flexibility in real wages must be explained by the higher volatility of 
inflation in the UK and the USA. Over a 45 years period, the standard deviation of 
inflation has been twice as high in the UK as in Germany and France and even three 
times higher in the US. In particular since the European Central Bank has become 
responsible for price stability, inflation has been low and steady.  We must conclude 
that the real wage flexibility is to a large degree determined by monetary policy and 
less by labour market institutions.  
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Table 1. Labour market flexibility   
       
Nominal wage 
flexibility 
 Germany France UK USA
1961-2005  0.037 0.047 0.046 0.027
1960s 0.045 0.023 0.021 0.022
1970s 0.027 0.021 0.050 0.020
1980s 0.015 0.033 0.017 0.017
1990s 0.022 0.011 0.016 0.013
EMU 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.021
 
Real wage 
flexibility   
 Germany France UK USA
1961-2005  0.038 0.036 0.060 0.092
1960s 0.027 0.033 0.034 0.018
1970s 0.031 0.036 0.074 0.073
1980s 0.036 0.029 0.072 0.159
1990s 0.029 0.023 0.057 0.071
EMU 0.017 0.012 0.044 0.087
 
Price volatility   
 Germany France UK USA
1961-2005  0.037 0.036 0.069 0.095
1960s 0.037 0.025 0.037 0.024
1970s 0.035 0.041 0.082 0.066
1980s 0.028 0.021 0.075 0.166
1990s 0.033 0.017 0.068 0.074
EMU 0.006 0.003 0.050 0.101
 
The capital market 
A rising capital share may be a necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition for 
economic growth and higher employment (See also Blanchard, 2000). What matters 
from a firm’s point of view is not only the cash flow, but ultimately profits to 
shareholders who invest in risky ventures. From a macroeconomic perspective this is 
reflected in what Keynes called entrepreneurial profits, that is the excess of income 
over the cost of labour plus capital. This concept can be translated into Tobin’s 
investment function, which made the rate of investment dependant on the ratio of a 
firm’s market value to it’s cost of reproduction.  There are several forms of 
calculating and expressing this ratio of “Tobin’s q”, but a simple way is comparing 
the aggregate price level to the cost price, which covers unit labour costs and capital 
costs per unit of output (Collignon, 1997). 
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The concept of Tobin’s q reformulated in this way is interesting because it correctly 
assigns responsibilities to economic agents: workers earn wages to live, capitalists 
earn interest to cover risk, and entrepreneurs earn (pure) profits for innovation.  Thus, 
the rate of interest allocates the operating income (the capital share) to entrepreneurs 
and capitalists.  Investment, economic growth and employment are dependent on 
entrepreneurial profits not just the capital share.  It is not the labour market that 
determines employment, but the capital market.
15  Figure 15 gives a picture of the 
evolution
16. Unit labour costs and the aggregate price level increased rapidly after the 
first oil shock and flattened in the disinflating 1980s. Fighting inflation was primarily 
achieved by high interest rates and this meant high cost of capital. It is possible that 
the exact level of the cost price relative to the price level has some data imprecision in 
the early years, but the main feature is clear: in Germany and France q-profits were 
low and falling in most of the 1970s. During this period both Germany and France’s 
investment shares in GDP fell from just under 30 percent to 20 percent. Profits and 
investment recuperated subsequently, but the high interest period after German 
unification eroded profitable investment opportunities again.  It is only since the 
beginning of EMU that Tobin’s q has reached levels comparable or slightly higher 
than in the Golden Age of the 1960s and France and Germany have today nearly 
identical values. If, however, investment has not  yet reached the levels of the 1960s, 
it is partly, as we will see, because profitability of investment is often higher in other 
parts of Europe and the world. We must therefore conclude that the slow economic 
growth and the low investment ratios observed in France and Germany are to a large 
degree dependent by macroeconomic policies.  These are crucially determined by 
monetary policy, which I will discuss in the second part of this paper, but first we 
need to look at the role of the public sector, as it is often blamed for burdening the 
private sector and irresponsible fiscal policies. 
 
                                                 
15 After all, we live in capitalism, not in labourism.  The allocation function of the labour market 
consists simply in finding relative prices for different kinds of labour.   
16 ULC stands for unit labour costs, P for the price level, measured by GDP-deflator, Pstar lt is the sum 
of ULC and unit capital costs calculated with long term interest rates, and Pstar st is the equivalent 
measured with short term interest rate. q st is Tobin’s q for calculated with short term interest rates, q lt 
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The democratic state and the public sector 
 
A common caricature paints France as the country where the Colbertiste dirigiste state 
reigns as a Leviathan, while the German social market economy combines market 
efficiency with a strong regulatory state. This picture has been somewhat challenged 
by the recent fad for Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, but it is important to understand 
how different societies articulate collective interests. In the French republican 
tradition, la volonté générale is the expression of free and equal citizens, understood 
as individuals engaged in the democratic management of public affairs.  Their 
political equality, reflected in universal suffrage, legitimises therefore state 
intervention into the economy and the overriding of economic freedom. Liberalism as 
an economic ideology has therefore always remained subordinate to the political 
“liberté républicaine”. An important side-effect of this concept was the elimination 
of intermediate institutions in the state and society (Rosanvallon, 2004) and therefore 
the strong dominance of a unitary state. 
 
In Germany, the emergence of a modern, democratic state is more recent (Kvistad, 
1999). The German concept of the state is both holistic in the sense of Popper S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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(1995)
17 and communitarian in the sense that belonging to a cultural/regional or group 
identity dominates individualism. This political ideology is therefore better articulated 
through intermediate institutions, such as the federalist structure of the state or 
corporatist interest organisations in the economy. The democratisation of these 
institutions only took root in German society after the war, when  Erhard’s social 
market economy promoted consumerism (“Wohlstand für Alle”) as a form of 
economic individualism and political and cultural individualism only emerged in 
German society during the late 1950s and the 1960s (Poiger, 1996; Kvistad, 1999).  
 
These ideological orientations in France are distinguished from the new market 
ideologies, which took hold in the UK and the US in the 1980s.  Neoliberalism was 
the attempt to roll back the state and re-dynamise the economy by liberating market 
forces. However, reducing the public sector also required invalidating the legitimacy 
of its activity.  As a consequence, neoliberalism undermines the democratic dimension 
of the modern state.  Yet at the same time, privatising the public creates externalities, 
which need to be internalised by collective rules and institutions. But as the state was 
discredited, the fall back position was the community: collective interests are now 
legitimately articulated by local private associations, NGO’s, or cultural and religious 
groups and communities and less by the democratic choice of free and equal citizens.  
This development is particularly apparent in the USA. In Europe it manifests itself in 
the resurgence of nationalism, for which British Europhobia is the most flagrant sign.  
Hence, the unintended consequence of neoliberalism as a dominant political ideology 
is the sharpening of communitarian and nationalist conflict and the hollowing out of 
democracy. Both are a threat to European integration (Collignon, 2004a).  
 
The public sector 
French and German societies have resisted the dominance of neoliberalism, although 
this resistance is weakening given the persistent sense of economic stagnation and the 
ideological dominance of neoliberal media. But is the public sector really the obstacle 
for renewed investment and economic growth?  Figure 16 shows the evolution of the 
share of total government expenditure in GDP. The low share in the US economy is 
                                                 
17 Popper (1995:100) defines holism as the norm “that the individual should subserve the interests of 
the whole, whether this be the universe, the city, the tribe, the race or any other collective body” he 
quotes Plato: “The part exists for the sake of the whole, but the whole does not exist for the sake of the 
part… You are created for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of you.” S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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coherent with the neoliberal model, although the government ratio increased in the 
Republican years of Reagan and Bush Sr. and Jr from 31 up to 37 percent, while it 
shrank under the Clinton presidency. The “Thatcher revolution” is more of a role 
model. After the initial recession in the early 1980s had been overcome, Thatcher’s 
reforms reduced the government share from 52 to 40 percent. The increase in the early 
1990s reflects partly the recession during years of ERM-membership. Only under the 
second term of New Labour does government expenditure grow again. 
 
In Germany we notice the strong expansion during the early years of the social 
democratic Brandt/Schmidt governments, but after the two oil shocks, and a widening 
budget deficit, the growth of the public sector is kept in line with economic growth. 
During the first two Kohl governments’ the focus is on deficit consolidation and a 
modest roll-back of the state took place. But with German unification, government 
expenditure reached it’s highest level ever. Not surprisingly, the consolidation of 
public finances became a priority after 1996, when the debt/GDP ratio approached the 
60 per cent Maastricht limit (see Figure 4) and government expenditure was now kept 
constant, so that its relative share fell with GDP-growth.  Schröder’s was the first and 
only government that ever cut expenditure in absolute terms in 2000. In France, public 
sector expansion coincided with the development of a modern welfare state in the 
early Mitterrand years, but expenditure progressed in line with GDP growth in the late 
1980s.  Its real growth  increased from 21/2  to 5 percent during the Jospin government 
and slowed down thereafter.  Its relative share in GDP increased with the strong 
recession of the mid-1990s and this increase was largely financed by the deficit. 
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While expenditure is subject to some discretion by governments, and the variation of 
the public sector share is affected by economic growth, the tax burden (including 
social charges) is a better indicator for collective preferences for public goods.  Figure 
17 shows that these preferences have been relatively stable in Germany from the late 
1970s to unification.  But subsequently, the cost of redeveloping the East has pushed 
the German tax burden to historic heights and they are only brought under control by 
the reforms of the Schröder government.  In France, the tax burden has been higher 
than in Germany for a quarter of a century and changing political majorities do not 
seem to affect this preference for public services significantly. In fact, as in Germany, 
it is the pressure of conforming to the standards of European fiscal policy that seems 
to have become more binding with the advent of the EMU: the tax burden increased 
when the debt ratio approached 60 percent. 
 
In the UK, on the other side, two important breaking points stick out: Thatcher’s tax 
reform in the early 1980s (higher VAT, lower income tax) has pushed tax revenue up, 
and the subsequent reduction in the share of public expenditure allowed the gradual 
lowering of the tax burden mainly by cutting income tax.  In that respect, the Thatcher 
reforms are fundamentally different from Schröder’s government, which has lowered 
taxes in the hope that this would stimulate output and future tax income, while France 
has done neither. Furthermore, despite the fact that British fiscal policy has remained 
Figure 17. Tax burden 
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unconstrained during the severe recession in the early 1990s,  a record deficit of 8 
percent of GDP in 1993 necessitated tax increases to support fiscal consolidation. 
When economic growth returned, this produced a record budget surplus of 4 percent, 
allowing another tax cut in 2000. 
 
The general picture that emerges from these data is indeed the relative stability of the 
public sector in France and Germany and the shrinking of government in the UK, 
although not in the US.  Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, the role of government was 
reduced in all four countries in absolute and relative terms, even if only to a small 
degree.  The question is: has the development of the public sector in France and 
Germany inhibited private capital accumulation, as neoliberals claim? 
 
The evidence is mixed. The public sector does not appear to have crowded out private 
income, investment and dampened growth in France, where both the tax burden and 
the investment ratio rose together in the late 1990s and also fell together after 2001.  
But in Germany the argument is stronger. While the tax burden has risen by 4-5 points 
since unification, the investment share has fallen by a similar amount.  Gross transfers 
from West to East have amounted to approximately 5 percent of GDP, amounting to 
1250 billion euros for the 1991-2003 period.
18 Thus, part of the slowdown of the 
German economy must be explained by a rising tax burden that is a result of 
unification.  
 
Figure 17 also reveals that an important part of the tax burden is due to social 
contributions.  It is apparent from Table 2 that France and Germany are both 
conservative welfare states, which finance social protection not by universal taxes but 
by status related contributions.  Germany and France have the highest share in social 







                                                 
18 Source: Der Spiegel, 15/2004 S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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Table 2. Tax burden in percent of GDP: 2004 
            
Country  
Social 
contributions  rank   Taxes  rank  Total  tax burden  rank 
FR. Germany  17.2% 1  24.0% 16  41.2%  10
France  16.6%  2 29.0% 9  45.6%  5
Euro area  14.9%  3  26.9%  11  41.8%  7
Netherlands 14.7%  4  25.9%  12  40.6%  12
Sweden  14.7%  5 37.9% 2  52.5%  1
Austria  14.6%  6 31.4% 5  46.0%  4
Belgium  14.4%  7 33.4% 3  47.8%  3
EU-15 13.4%  8  28.3%  10  41.6%  9
Spain 12.9%  9  23.8%  17  36.7%  15
Italy 12.4%  10  29.3%  7  41.8%  8
Finland 12.3%  11  32.2%  4  44.5%  6
Portugal  11.8%  12 24.5% 15  36.3%  16
Luxembourg 11.6%  13  29.1%  8  40.7%  11
Greece  11.5%  14 25.4% 14  37.0%  14
United 
Kingdom 7.6%  15  30.4%  6  38.0%  13
Ireland  4.6% 16 25.8% 13  30.4%  17
Denmark 1.7%  17  47.6%  1  49.3%  2
 
In Germany, social contributions have risen rapidly after 1991. They were the “petit 
cash” (Portokasse) from which Helmut Kohl had promised to finance unification. It is 
commonly understood that this method of financing has distortionary effects by 
creating a wedge between labour costs and income and thereby contribute to 
unemployment. This issue was tackled more aggressively in France when the Juppé 
government imposed highly controversial reforms in 1995/6 that translated into a 
significant drop of social contributions but were refinanced by taxes.  The irony is that 




Another dimension is public investment.  While gross fixed capital formation in 
percent of GDP has fallen in the private and public sectors, the relative importance of 
the public sector in the total capital stock has continuously fallen in Germany since 
the first oil shock from 4.4 to 2.5 percent in 1991, and German unification has even 
accelerated this trend. Today public investment is only 1.4 percent of GDP in 
Germany, against a stable share of 3 percent in France, 2.8 in the US. In the UK the 
share is up at 2.8 after its all time low at 1.1 percent in 1999. Thus, it is not true that 
the pressure from fiscal policy rules under the Stability and Growth Pact have 
imposed a “neoliberal” policy regime on France and Germany. In fact the distribution S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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of investment between the private and the public sector seems to follow an alternative 
logic to ideology: the share of public investment in the build up of the nation’s capital 
stock is similar to France’s in the USA and close to Germany in the UK. 
 
In sum, it would appear that the claim of an excessive public sector, which is slowing 
down investment and growth, is overrated.  Public investment can contribute to higher 
productivity and increased welfare and this is lacking, particularly in Germany. But 
public expenditure needs to be financed in a broad and egalitarian manner, which 
avoids distortions and gives the wrong incentives. This is clearly where the 
conservative social model in Germany and France is failing. France seems to have 
made slightly more progress than Germany, but as the economic results show, a lot 
more needs to be done.  
 
 
Learning to live in Euroland 
 
Our analysis has shown that France and Germany have converged in their economic 
performance over the last decades and tended to adopt similar financial and with the 
euro even shared monetary institutions. On the supply side, these two economies 
resemble more to each other than, say, to the USA or UK.  This may partly explain, 
why France and Germany were able to adopt the same currency, while this seems so 
difficult for the UK.  However, economic policy operates under a radically changed 
framework in the EMU.  By focusing on price stability, the European Central Bank 
sets the overall budget constraint for Euroland and individual firms and jurisdictions 
must compete for funds and revenue within the given parameters.  I will now focus on 
the adjustment of the French and German economies to this new world, then on issues 
of macro-economic management and will conclude with some broader political 
considerations. 
 
Adjusting to EMU 
 
A monetary union is defined by equal and unrestricted access to liquidity, which is 
supplied by the central bank at an interest rate of its choosing. Thus, the cost of capital S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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is essentially the same across countries (abstracting from borrower risk). Monetary 
policy will affect q-profits for the whole of Euroland, but the distribution of 
entrepreneurial profits will depend on relative profit margins, i.e. relative prices and 
unit labour costs. It has often been asserted that forming a monetary union abolishes 
monetary policy as an adjustment tool and should only be acceptable when product 
and labour market flexibility is sufficient to allow the elimination of distortions and 
the adjustment after shocks. Even if it is doubtful that the exchange rate can serve as 
an adjustment tool other than in the very short term (Collignon, 2002), the capability 
to adjust is crucial in any economy. We will therefore now analyse this flexibility. 
 
Relative price and cost adjustments 
A unified interest rate implies equal cost of capital and therefore the disappearance of 
distortions, which previously prevailed in the European single market.  In the old 
days, firms and borrowers outside the core countries with low interest rates, like 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, but also to some degree, France, had to put up 
with higher interest rates and therefore lower investment.  This created a comparative 
advantage for firms in countries with high price stability and low interest rates. But 
once EMU was seen as a credible project, interest rates converged to German 
standards and their advantage disappeared.   The previous high interest regions in 
Euroland became more attractive for investment and the location of production. 
Hence, in order to remain competitive, regions with a disappearing capital cost 
advantage had to compensate by creating a labour cost advantage. This required 
adjustment in the labour market.  It has often been questioned whether Germany, and 
to a lesser degree, France were sufficiently flexible to adjust to the new environment, 
so let us look at the facts. 
 
While in many other countries, entrepreneurial profits increased to the detriment of 
rentiers, this was less the case in those countries, which used to follow German 
monetary policies most closely in the past.  Table 3 gives the increase in Tobin’s q 
from 1996, when EMU became a realistic option, to 2001, a neutral year after the 
boom and before the crash. Tobin’s q actually fell in the countries of the former hard 
Deutschmark bloc, stagnated in France, buy increased by 7.2 percent in Euroland as a 
whole. 
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Table 3. Change in Tobin’s q: 1996-2001 
 rank
Netherlands  -6.4% 1
Belgium -4.7% 2
Germany   -4.0% 3
Austria -2.5% 4
France   0.2% 5
Finland 3.1% 6
Luxembourg  5.7% 7







The striking feature is indeed the deterioration of Tobins’s q in the countries closest to 
the old Deutschmark-bloc and the dramatic increase in the South-European countries 
with previously high interest rates. 
 
A closer look at the change over time reveals that Germany had a significantly higher 
q  before 1998 that fell below Euroland’s aggregate q  afterwards (see Figure 15). 
However, Germany has made efforts since 1999 to improve the situation and is now 
again catching up with the average Euro-q.  On the other hand, France, which used to 
have a higher q than Euroland in the 1990s, has gradually lost this advantage and has 
now fallen slightly below the average.  It is of interest too, that since 1999 there has 
been convergence of national profitability to the Euroland average among all 
countries of EMU.  The standard deviation of Tobin’s q in the Euro-area was close to 
0.190 between 1996-1999, but after the ECB took over it fell to 0.104 in 2003. It can 
also be shown that economic growth was positively correlated with the relative 
improvement in profitability, even if there were some country specific differences (the 
correlation coefficient between the change in Tobin’s q and GDP-growth is +0.48).  
Hence, overcoming stagnation in Germany and France requires a relative 
improvement in the profitability relative to other countries in Euroland. Obviously 
this adjustment is not related to the ECB’s policy, because interest rates are identical 
for all operators in EMU. Increasing or cutting interest rates will stimulate or paralyse 
the Euro-zone as a whole. It is, of course, possible that some capital-intensive sectors, 
like manufacturing industry, may respond more strongly to interest variations. But in 
essence,  monetary policy is a macro-instrument unsuitable for relative adjustment. 
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Competitiveness in Euroland 
In the old days of the European monetary system and before unification, Germany’s 
competitiveness was largely determined by lower inflation relative to other countries. 
With fixed exchange rates within the block, real exchange rates depreciated and 
Germany realised substantial trade surpluses in Europe. At the same time, the DM-
dollar exchange rate appreciated and trade was more balanced.  In 1989, Germany’s 
trade surplus with EU-member states was over 5 per cent of GDP, but with the rest of 
the world only 0.8 percent.  After unification, this imbalance was reduced.  With the 
introduction of the Euro, the logic has changed.  External price competitiveness 
depends now on the exchange rate of the euro, which is the same for all companies in 
Euroland.  Within Euroland, it is a matter of relative prices.  After introducing the 
euro, inflation has come under the control of the European Central Bank and is 
calculated for policy purposes for Euroland as a whole. Only small deviations of 
relative prices for product groups and regions (countries) are possible. These 
deviations reflect differences in taste and preferences, as well as differences in costs 
for non-tradable goods and inputs, of which labour is the most important on an 
aggregate level but they are not policy induced. While the cost of capital is essentially 
the same for every company operating in the same monetary area, an improvement in 
relative profitability can therefore only be achieved by two mechanisms: an 
adjustment in relative unit labour costs, or in prices. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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Figure 19 shows the evolution of relative unit labour cost levels in Euroland (as the 
deviation from average).  We find significant country variations.  While Portugal, 
Italy, Spain and Belgium have a clear competitive disadvantage, Ireland and Finland 
are attractive labour locations with low average labour costs.  France and Germany 
are close to, but slightly below average.  But while unit labour costs have kept a stable 
position in France, Germany has gained competitive advantage by keeping nominal 
wage increases behind productivity advances, as discussed above.  Thus, the 
behaviour of wage moderation by German Trade Unions has supported the adjustment 
to the new environment of EMU, rather than “strangling the economy”. 
 
But if Germany’s competitive cost position is improving, why is it not translating into 
higher growth and more jobs? The answer is that it actually does.  Since 1999, 
Germany’s export share has increased from 25.7 percent of GDP to 32 percent in 
2004 and its trade balance from 3.3 to 6.5 percent.  However, the improvement is now 
more balanced between intra and extra European trade, which is what we would 
expect as a result of the weak euro and relative price adjustment within the Union.  
Yet, economic growth and employment are still disappointing.  The reason must be 
that profits are too low, particularly in the domestic non-tradables sector.  Without the 
improvements in the tradables sector, Germany’s situation would be even worse.   
Figure 19. Evolution of relative ULC levels in EMU
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Given that the cost of capital are fixed by interest rates, entrepreneurial profits depend 
on operating profit, i.e. on the difference between prices and unit labour costs.  
 
Table 4. Changes in Profitability: Euroland 1999-2004 
(average changes per annum) 
    
Prices  relative  to € ULCs  relative  to € Margins relative  to €
EU-15   1.8%  0.0%  1.8%  0.2%  0.0%  -0.1% 
Euro area   1.8%  0.0%  1.6%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0% 
            
Greece 2.4%  0.7%  1.5%  0.0%  0.9% 0.7% 
Ireland 3.2%  1.5%  2.4%  0.9%  0.8% 0.6% 
Spain 3.3%  1.6%  2.7%  1.1%  0.6% 0.4% 
Austria 1.2%  -0.5%  0.8%  -0.7%  0.4% 0.2% 
Germany 0.9%  -0.8%  0.6%  -1.0%  0.3% 0.2% 
Finland 1.5%  -0.2%  1.4%  -0.2%  0.1% -0.1% 
Portugal 3.1%  1.4%  3.0%  1.4%  0.0% -0.1% 
Italy 2.2%  0.5%  2.2%  0.6%  0.0% -0.2% 
Netherlands 2.8%  1.1%  2.9%  1.3%  0.0% -0.2% 
France 1.3%  -0.4%  1.5%  -0.1%  -0.2% -0.3% 
Belgium 1.2%  -0.5%  1.8%  0.2%  -0.6% -0.7% 
Luxembourg 1.9%  0.2%  3.1%  1.5%  -1.2% -1.3% 
 
Table 4 shows that average profit margins in Euroland have hardly changed in the 
first 6 years of the EMU. They have increased by one per mille per annum, because 
unit labour costs have grown slightly less than prices. But the relative position of 
individual countries has changed. Greece, Ireland and Spain, all fast growing 
countries in the Eurozone, have improved profitability relative to the average, mainly 
because they have been able to increase relative prices. By contrast, Austria and 
Germany moved marginally ahead by lowering unit labour costs more than prices 
relative to the average. By contrast, in France and Finland profit margins deteriorated 
because prices were more depressed than unit labour costs. In the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg profits fell because wages increased faster than prices, and in Belgium 
profit margins were diminished because prices fell and labour costs increased.  
 
The return on capital 
These changes in profitability show that the adjustment process in Euroland is 
working well, although in a more complex fashion than simple theories would expect. 
However, in order to understand the dynamics of investment and growth, profit 
margins and their distribution between rentiers and entrepreneurs are not enough. We 
need to compare the gross return on capital, which we may define as the share of S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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capital income (the inverse of the wage share) multiplied by average capital 
productivity (output per capital).  For even if Tobin’s q may be higher in France and 
Germany than in previous decades, the return on capital may still be higher elsewhere.  
With unrestricted capital markets investment may then still flow into countries where 















Figure 20 shows the evolution of the aggregate return on capital in some selected 
countries. The negative consequences of the two oil shocks are clear. By the mid-
1980s, the gross return on capital improved across Europe, although the economic 
crisis caused by German unification and the subsequent monetary turbulences 
interrupted this trend. In Euroland the gross return on capital has been stagnating, 
although the Commission forecast for 2005 expects an improvement. Whether the 
stagnation of rates of return since the beginning 21
st century reflects the slowdown 
after the 9/11 shock or a more fundamental structural change is uncertain.  
 
Germany’s main problem since the mid 1980s has been that the return on its capital 
stock has been below the returns achievable in other countries. Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable how returns on capital have continuously improved since 1995. This 
process continues unabatedly from the Kohl into the Schröder years. Given that it can 
only partially be explained by better profit margins (namely from 1993 to 1998 and 
not thereafter – see Figure 14), this must be due to improvements in the productivity S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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of the capital stock. Because new investment is weak, the adjustment takes the form 
of eliminating and liquidating less profitable productive capacity in a demand 
constrained economy.  The picture that emerges here is that Germany is improving its 
competitiveness although with great pain and adjusting to the new economic 
environment in monetary union on the background of heavy burden acquired by 
unification, although with great pain.  
 
This cannot be said of France. The profitability of the French capital stock has 
deteriorated as a consequence of the 35 heures, the resulting lower productivity per 
employee and the rising wage share.  Today both French and German capital stocks 
have the same return on average. Yet, both countries now achieve a higher return to 
capital than Euroland as a whole. But this profitability does not translate into 
productive investment and the expansion of capacity because both countries also share 
weak aggregate demand that depresses local prices. In both Germany and France, 
Tobin’s q is slightly below Euroland as we saw before.  The higher return on capital 
therefore benefits financial investment and not job creation. As Germany is now 
painfully discovering, reducing labour costs is not leading to higher investment 
because prices are falling even faster. Both countries together represent 50 percent of 
the Euro-economy. Therefore a beggar-your-neighbourhood strategy, which can be 
successful for small countries, does not work for Franceallemagne. The stimulus for 
economic growth has to come from a better policy mix for the Euro area as a whole.  
 
 
The role of France and Germany for Europe’s Policy mix 
Given the weight of France and Germany in Euroland’s GDP, the scope of relative 
adjustment with respect to the Euro average is necessarily limited for these two 
economies.  While small countries must consider European competition as an 
exogenous constraint to which they can adapt, a reduction in the unit labour costs 
(ULC) of large countries implies a simultaneous lowering of the average unit labour 
cost for Euroland.  Although this fact may push other countries above the average and 
therefore improve the relative competitiveness of the large country, the lower average 
unit labour costs have macroeconomic externalities: if the central bank kept interest 
rates unchanged, the aggregate price level (or inflation) would fall with average ULC 
as the cost of capital remain unchanged.  But because wage bargainers take Euroland S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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inflation into account when setting nominal wages, the relative wage adjustment in 
large countries will lead to a general reduction in wage and price inflation.  As a 
consequence, large countries will find it more difficult to improve profit margins by 
labour market adjustments than small countries.   
 
In other words, small countries can improve profits and competition directly by wage 
adjustments while the profitability of investment in large countries is more dependent 
on macroeconomic policy.  In fact, if average unit labour costs fall relative to the 
inflation target of the ECB, the central bank should lower interest rates in order to 
maintain price stability.  This would increase Tobin’s q for the whole Euro zone and 
push market prices above their now reduced cost-covering levels, leading to higher 
demand, investment and employment.  In this case, the large country would benefit 
from the monetary policy stimulus as a result of relative price adjustments.  But if the 
central bank fails to reduce interest rates, because for example lax fiscal policies 
require an increase in the equilibrium interest rate, then relative wage adjustments will 
not improve a large country’s growth perspectives.  Thus, wage adjustments in large 
countries require a supportive macroeconomic framework, while wage adjustments in 
small countries have little consequence for macroeconomic stability in Euroland.  Re-
igniting economic growth in France and Germany is therefore not only a question of 
labour market flexibility.  It depends on designing a policy mix that stimulates 
investment and profitability generally without causing inflation. 
 
Defining the policy mix 
When discussing macroeconomic policy, we must distinguish between an efficient 
policy mix and an optimal policy mix.  The efficient interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policy is defined by effective demand being equal to potential output, i.e. by 
the economy being in “full employment” without inflation.  This macroeconomic 
equilibrium implies that many combinations of fiscal and monetary policy mixes are 
efficient.  If budget deficits are high, equilibrium interest rates have to be high as well 
in order to restrain demand.  And inversely, if the budget position is in balance or 
surplus, the equilibrium interest rate should be low (Collignon, 2003).  Which 
particular combination between different efficient policy mixes is chosen is a matter 
of collective preferences, but if monetary and fiscal policy together are either too 
restrictive or too lax, the mix is inefficient, as it will cause unemployment or inflation.  S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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An optimal policy mix maximises the collective utilities, given the constraint of the 
efficient combinations of monetary and fiscal policy.  The collective preferences may 
change over time.  For example, the then French finance minister Strauss-Kahn 
referred to the combination of high interest rates and high deficits in the US economy 
of the 1980s as the “Reagan-Volker policy mix”, while the combination of low 
interest rates and budget surpluses in the 1990s corresponded to the “Clinton-
Greenspan policy mix”.  In the United States these particular realisations were the 
result of collective choices made through the democratic process.  Given that the 
federal deficit is the primary tool for fiscal stabilisation in the United States, electing a 
new President and Congress with different preferences automatically translated into a 
different policy mix.
19 In Europe, however, finding an optimal policy mix is more 
complicated. While monetary policy is unified, fiscal policy remains splintered under 
the authority of national governments.  As a consequence, the aggregate fiscal stance 
for the Eurozone is the more or less random result of uncoordinated fiscal policy 
decisions, which reflect the democratic choices made by different segregated national 
electorates. For example, after the Presidential elections in France in the year 2002, 
the structural deficit immediately deteriorated from 2 to more than 3 percent, 
reflecting Jacques Chirac’s electoral promise to lower taxes.  Yet, although this choice 
had consequences for the policy mix in Euroland as a whole, citizens in no other 
member state could participate in the decision. A clear definition of what the 
aggregate European fiscal stance is supposed to be is therefore impossible within 
today’s institutional framework. 
 
The role of fiscal policy 
The existing institutional arrangement effectively deprives the European Union of 
fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool. In fact, fiscal policy, in the sense of choosing a 
sequence of measures aimed at optimising welfare, does not exist in Europe. The 
Stability and Growth Pact does of course provide a rule how the aggregate fiscal 
policy stance is to be defined, namely, each and every country should balance its 
structural deficits, so that the aggregate structural budget is also balanced. The 
efficient policy combination requires then that the European Central Bank sets interest 
rates so that the deviation from potential output are minimised. However, apart from 
                                                 
19 For a detailed description of the shift to the Clinton-Geenspan mix see Woodward, 2000. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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the issue of whether the ECB does achieve this objective, there are two interconnected 
problems with this rule. First, member states are not complying; at least they have not 
been complying since the beginning of EMU. In 2003, seven out of 12 member states 
had structural deficits, according to the European Commission data. The aggregate 
structural deficit in Euroland was in excess of 2 percent and not zero as the Pact 
demands. The reason for this non-compliance is, of course, that national governments 
prioritise domestic choices over European commitments.  Ultimately, the democratic 
process within countries will always take precedence over intergovernmental 
agreements made by ministers and their bureaucracies.  In the long run, it is not 
realistic to expect that democratically elected governments would ignore voters who 
whish them to lower taxes and to increase deficits – just because some years or 
decades earlier an agreement was made to balance budgets.   
 
This relates to the second difficulty of the Pact. Because the aggregate fiscal stance is 
uncertain, the central bank becomes obsessed with fiscal policy and underrates other 
factors like wage developments.  In the existing set-up, stabilisation policy depends 
exclusively on monetary policy and the ECB tries to “signal” to governments what 
budget policy it expects so that is task of maintaining price stability is served. But as 
the Eurogroup of finance ministers cannot commit to a common stance for the above-
mentioned reasons of democracy, monetary policy will over-react to fiscal laxity. 
Hence, demand management will focus primarily on budget policies and will not 
respond sufficiently to wage developments, which might allow more growth oriented 
monetary policies.  This translates into a serious policy obstacle when average unit 
labour costs fall as a result of relative price adjustment in large member states. 
 
Empirical observations 
This dynamic has been clearly witnessed since the start of EMU. Figure 21 shows the 
combinations of monetary policy with fiscal and wage developments. Monetary 
policy is considered “loose” when the weighted index
20 of short term interest rates and 
the Euroland real effective exchange rate falls and “tight” otherwise. Fiscal policy is 
soft, when the structural budget position deteriorates and tight when it improves.
21  
                                                 
20 The formula is (∆i+a∆REER)/2, where i is the short term interest rate, a=0.26 is the share of foreign 
trade (imports plus exports) to GDP and REER the Euroland real effective exchange rate. 
21 The European Commission uses the structural primary budget position to define the fiscal policy 
stance. This is correct when looking at the discretionary fiscal choices of governments. However, I S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
  53
Wage policy is tight, when nominal wages increase by less than 2 percent over 
productivity growth.
22 In other words, wage restraint implies that wage inflation will 
remain below the ECB inflation target plus trend productivity. Wage policies are 













Two features are striking in Figure 21: During the first six years of EMU, the ECB 
has never tightened its stance when either fiscal or wage policies were conservative.  
Only in the boom year 2000, when both fiscal and wage policies were loose, was 
monetary policy restrictive.  Second, monetary policy responds to fiscal and wage 
policies in a similar fashion, even if changes in the monetary condition are correlated 
with larger swings in wage dynamics than in fiscal policy. For example, a softening in 
monetary conditions by 10 percent in 2002 is correlated with a fiscal policy tightening 
of 27 percent, while wage restraint has undershot the inflation target by nearly 100 
percent (which implies that unit labour cost remained constant).  This is evidence that 
the ECB underrates wage developments relative to fiscal policy.  Further and most 
importantly, the trend-lines of the two policy curves are both downward sloping.   
                                                                                                                                            
focus here on the budget rule of the SGP and that requires using the structural deficit. Although the 
shape of the chart is affected by these measures, the fundamental message is not. 
22 Productivity growth was averaged over 5 years in order to avoid distortions due to the business cycle. 
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Thus, both policies re-enforce each other.
23 As a consequence, fiscal laxity prevents 
interest rates from being reduced sufficiently when average unit labour costs in 
Euroland remain behind the inflation target.  If the Euro zone wishes to return to more 
investment, growth and employment, wage restraint would have to overcompensate 
the fiscally induced rise in equilibrium interest rates. But this poses major problems 
for the adjustment of large countries in Euroland. 
 
Since 1999, Germany, but not France, has consistently improved its competitive 
position, as we saw (Figure 19), by lowering unit labour costs relative to its 
neighbours. It has thereby also restrained the average growth of wage costs in 
Euroland. But wage moderation also implies less government revenue and larger 
public deficits.   Furthermore, fiscal policy was loosened by the German tax reform in 
2000, that intended to improve German competitiveness from the supply side. The 
result was an increase in Euroland’s aggregate structural deficit (to which France also 
wholeheartedly contributed) and an increase in the equilibrium interest rate. Hence, 
monetary policy could not be loosened as much as was required by wage 
developments. The German adjustment strategy was counterproductive. This explains 
partly why Germany’s profit margins are improving so little, despite rigorous efforts 
to reform labour markets and reduce unit labour costs. 
 
The increase in equilibrium interest rates was not warranted by developments in the 
labour market but purely and simply a consequence of autonomous fiscal policy 
actions by member state governments. It has prevented a larger increase in Tobin’s q, 
which is needed as an incentive for investment and to create jobs. Thus, it is the 
institutional arrangement of unified monetary policy and uncoordinated national 
responsibilities for fiscal policies that yields clearly sub-optimal policy results.
24 If 
fiscal policy is to be an instrument to stabilise the European economy, the aggregate 
fiscal policy stance has to be decided at the level of Euroland. However, such a 
European policy stance can only be legitimate if, and only if, it was endorsed by 
                                                 
23 Regressing the monetary condition index on fiscal and wage policy variables is obviously not very 
significant with 6 observations and two parameters. But it gives a rough indication of the coefficients 
and their direction:  
                     Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
change structural deficit       -0.279971     0.1854    -1.51   0.206   0.3631 
ULC target deviation        -0.112608    0.03899    -2.89   0.045   0.6758 
24 The dominant neo-liberal discourse about the need for greater labour market flexibility obscures this 
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European citizens through a proper democratic process. Optimising the policy mix in 
Europe therefore poses the question of democracy.  
 
 
Efficiency and legitimacy of economic policies in a democratic  
European Union 
 
The issues of efficiency and legitimacy of public policies are linked. Without 
legitimacy, efficient policies are not possible. However, the process of legitimate 
decision-making requires more than efficient policy output; it is dependent on 
constitutional rules and procedures, which allow individual citizens to participate in 
the process. This participation does not imply direct policy input by all citizens at all 
times, but the delegation of decision making to collective institutions where policy 
makers are accountable for their actions and revocable by citizens. Elections are the 
formal renewal of the contract, whereby the principal (citizens) charges an agent (the 
government) with the task of defending their collective interests and maximising 
welfare. No modern democracy is perceivable without this right. Furthermore, it is a 
central characteristic of democracies that, prior to the renewal of the agency-contract 
between citizens and governments, an electoral campaign takes place, in which citizen 
exchange views and opinions about collective preferences. During these campaigns 
citizens are not only informing themselves of the potential choices and options, but 
the process of deliberation during the campaign is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of public opinions that reflect at least the majority.  
 
European democracy? 
The European Union is not a democracy. It is true that member states are 
democratically elected and represent their citizens in the European Council. But with 
respect to European policies, the sovereign (i.e. European citizens who are affected by 
these decisions) have no institutional right to ask the European decision maker (the 
Council or the European Commission) to render accounts for their action and to 
dismiss them, if they do not reflect their preferences. The legitimacy of European 
policy-making is a derivative of national policy. No collective deliberation across 
countries takes place in the European Union, despite the fact the European Parliament S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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is elected by citizens. The reason is that the Parliament, despite an increasing role of 
co-decision in legislation, does not have the right to revoke decision-makers.
25 As a 
legislator, the (European) Council is more like “an eternal parliament” that gets 
repeatedly renewed by by-elections without ever having to undergo a general election. 
As a consequence, policy debates remain confined to national public spheres and 
debates and the emergence of proper collective Europeans preferences takes 
extremely long, if it happens at all.
26 The fundamental social contract between 
European citizens and their European agent does not allow them to participate in the 
process of policy making. At best they learn from each other, as information “trickles 
down” from the interactions of policy elites. As a consequence, the lack of democracy 
in the European Union does not only contribute to a rift between citizens and 
European Policy makers but it also undermines the efficiency of outcomes from a 
welfare point of view.  
 
The proper remedy for this dilemma is the creation of a European political union with 
full democratic legitimacy. Such a political union would then also be able to define 
and conduct more efficient macroeconomic policies. For example, it could set the 
aggregate fiscal policy stance, while leaving the implementation largely to national 
governments (Collignon, 2004). Here is not the place to discuss these ideas in detail. 
However, I would like to raise the question of whether France and Germany could 
become the motor for proposing such a new step of political deepening in the 
European union.  
 
The Franco-German motor 
The answer depends crucially on the understanding of the role of the State in society. 
In France, the idea of Republic has traditionally given a prominent role to individual 
citizens as actors in the political process, who express their volonté générale in the 
institution of the State. In Germany, the actor was usually conceived as the State-
bureaucracy whose role was to protect the whole of a hierarchically structured 
community rather than individual citizens. However, in both countries political 
ideologies have evolved. Germany has become more democratic and citizen 
orientated, while France has recognised the need for decentralising the control of state 
                                                 
25 The recent threat of rejection of the Baroso-Commission is both, a sign that things may change and a 
reminder of Parliament’s severe restrictions in appointing the Commission. 
26 In Collignon 2003, I have formulated this argument in a formal model. S.COLLIGNON   LEARNING TO LIVE IN EUROLAND 
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organs and creating intermediated institutional layers. Both societies are therefore 
converging towards a model of society that is more individualistic and democratic. 
The holistic traditions, which were still so present in both countries’ political 
ideologies during the 1960s and 70s, have lost some of their power. This offers an 
opportunity to go forward and confirm citizens in their status as European sovereigns.  
 
This ideological convergence does not necessarily imply that both countries have 
become “neo-liberal”. For neo-liberalism implies the fusion of liberal and nationalist 
or communitarian ideologies. In fact one of the consequences of the Mitterrand 
presidency and the Jospin premiership was the emergence of a more modern social-
liberal society, based on monetary market economy. Simultaneously, the ordo-liberal 
legacy of the German model is melting, with Social Democrats promoting a more 
pragmatic form of managed capitalism (Dyson, 2003).  This ideological conversion in 
France and Germany reflects, to a large degree, the economic convergence which has 
taken place in both countries over recent years and decades and was documented in 
this paper.  As a consequence, it should be not only possible, but even natural, that 
together France and Germany could take the initiative of pushing European 
integration forward towards a political union that establishes proper democratic 
procedures. However, this process is unlikely to come from the bureaucratic elites and 
policy circles that dominate decision making in both countries. It will have to come 
from their civil societies. Ultimately, it is not up to France or Germany, but to 
European citizens whether they re-appropriate the power that is theirs as the European 
sovereign. 
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